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CHALLENGING CONCEPTIONS OF ACCESSORY LIABILITY IN PRIVATE LAW 
PAULINE RIDGE* AND JOACHIM DIETRICH** 
This article concerns recent challenges to the utility of ‘accessory liability’ as an organising 
principle or concept in private law and argues that accessory liability is a coherent body of 
law with common features that is worthy of separate, holistic treatment. We defend a 
conceptual framework for accessory liability which is dynamic in its operation and which does 
not dictate the precise legal content of accessory liability in different contexts. Such a 
conception of accessory liability has come under challenge from recent cases and commentary 
which either minimise the scope and analytical relevance of accessory liability altogether in 
equity and tort law or propound a conceptual framework for accessory liability that is fixed in 
its application and uniform in its content across the whole of private law. Our purpose in this 
article is to resist both the dismissal of, and simplification of, accessory liability in private law.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is rare for the law to impose liability on one person for wrongful conduct engaged in by 
another. Accessory liability is one instance in which this occurs. In broad terms, accessory 
liability arises where a party involves herself in another’s wrongdoing — the primary wrong 
— with a sufficient mental state such as to be legally at fault. That fault justifies the accessory 
(A) being held liable to the claimant (C) to remedy the consequences of the primary wrong.  
In previous work we argued that accessory liability in private law is a coherent body of law 
with common features that is worthy of separate, holistic treatment.1 We proposed a conceptual 
framework that is dynamic in its operation and that does not dictate the precise legal content 
of accessory liability in different contexts. This conception of accessory liability does not 
depend upon whether the accessory is liable for the same wrong as the primary wrongdoer (that 
is, they are joint wrongdoers) or is held liable for a different wrong (that is, accessory liability 
constituting a distinct wrong). Hence, it reaches into most areas of private law.  
Since then, however, several very different views about the role of accessorial concepts in the 
law have either emerged or crystallised. On the one hand, some commentators minimise the 
scope and analytical relevance of accessory liability to equity and tort law. These views are 
evident in recent scholarly treatments and are given some support in a recent Australian case 
at the highest level. Such approaches challenge the utility of analysing or indeed, describing, 
liability as accessorial. On the other hand, a recent monograph accepts the importance of 
                                                          
* Australian National University.  
** Bond University. We are grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their generous and constructive reviews. 
1 See generally J. Dietrich and P. Ridge, Accessories in Private Law (Cambridge 2015). 
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accessory liability, but propounds a conceptual framework for the liability that is fixed in its 
application and uniform in its content. Our purpose in this article is to resist both the dismissal, 
and simplification, of accessory liability in private law that is evident in these recent 
developments.  Hence, the article concerns the utility of ‘accessory liability’ as an organising 
principle or concept in private law. Does accessory liability, as we will explain it, still make 
better sense of certain liabilities across private law than other explanations of those liabilities, 
including other conceptions of accessory liability itself? 
The topic is important. Legal theorising of the type discussed in this article is not completely 
abstracted from the law in practice. The shared objective of each of the conceptions of law 
critiqued below is to explain the law from an internal legal perspective in a way that will assist 
courts and legislators to develop that law in a coherent fashion. Whichever conception, if any, 
finds favour with the courts will have practical ramifications for the conduct, and outcome, of 
litigation. This is because the requisite elements of liability, the judicial method for determining 
whether such elements are satisfied, as well as the boundaries of liability in different areas of 
law, are all affected by one’s conception of the liability itself. 
After briefly outlining our preferred conception of accessory liability (Part II) and the 
terminological confusion regarding accessory and related liabilities (Part III), the article 
continues in Part III to discuss two conceptual challenges to accessory liability that would 
dramatically reduce its scope and relevance in equity and in the law of torts respectively. These 
approaches dismiss the relevance of accessory liability altogether. Part IV evaluates an 
alternative conception of accessory liability itself and argues that it promotes a degree of 
uniformity and simplicity that is at odds with, and to the detriment of, the existing law.  
The jurisdictional focus is on English and Australian private law: although the laws in these 
two jurisdictions have a common heritage, they have also diverged in significant ways, 
particularly in the context of equitable accessory principles, such as to provide a useful 
comparison.2 
II. THE PREFERRED CONCEPTION OF ACCESSORY LIABILITY 
                                                          
2 Although it will be necessary in Part III C to consider briefly the criminal law of complicity, the fundamental 
differences between civil and criminal law, as well as the complexity and confusion surrounding criminal 
accessory and related liabilities, make anything other than peripheral consideration of the criminal law unwise 
and unhelpful.  
3 
 
Across private law, one circumstance in which liability will be imposed on a person for the 
wrongful conduct of another is where three elements are present:  
(i) A primary wrong3 committed by a person (the primary wrongdoer, PW);  
(ii) Involvement, through conduct, by someone other than PW (the accessory, A), 
in the primary wrong; and, 
(iii) A has a requisite mental state relating to the primary wrong at the time of the 
conduct.  
At its simplest, it can be said that accessory liability arises where a party involves herself in 
another’s wrongdoing with a sufficient mental state such as to be legally at fault and, thus, 
responsible. It is necessary, however, to add three details to this bare conceptual framework in 
order to accurately represent the scope and operation of accessory liability across private law. 
They concern the legal content of each element, the dynamic operation of the framework and 
the form of liability.  
First, the doctrinal or legislative content of the conduct (ii) and mental (iii) elements of the 
framework — and hence, fault — is determined by reference to the purposes and values of the 
law governing the primary wrong, element (i). Importantly, this means that the precise content 
of elements (ii) and (iii) may and does vary. Accordingly, the framework does not dictate that 
the legal rules for accessory liability be identical across private law. In other words, the 
framework does not constitute a generic cause of action, but rather an organising principle of 
liability. For example, the equitable wrong of dishonest (or knowing) assistance has less 
onerous conduct and knowledge requirements than the tort of inducing breach of contract. 
Nonetheless, both embody the same conceptual framework for liability.4  
Secondly, the three elements of the framework relate in dynamic fashion. In particular, there is 
a relationship between the weightings accorded to elements (ii) and (iii) which in combination 
establish liability. In some areas of law and jurisdictions the dynamic operation of the 
framework manifests at the level of the judicial inquiry into liability. An example is the 
requirement for equitable accessory liability in English law that A be ‘dishonestly’ involved in 
                                                          
3 We use the term ‘wrong’ in a broad, but conventional sense, to mean breach of a legal duty that leads to remedial 
outcomes and as including breaches of common law and equitable duties. Breaches of statutory duty that give rise 
to private action also come within the ambit of ‘wrong’. 
4 Cf., Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378, 392 and OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 
1 A.C. 1, at [39]-[44].  
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any breach of trust or fiduciary duty.5 This requires a normative judgement to be made as to 
A’s conduct in all the circumstances, including A’s mental state.6 In other jurisdictions this 
dynamic feature is embedded in the doctrinal formulation. For example, the equivalent 
Australian equitable doctrine of knowing assistance requires that A knowingly involve herself 
in ‘a dishonest and fraudulent design’ by the trustee or fiduciary.7 Here, an egregious primary 
wrong is required; consequently, the conduct and mental elements are set at a relatively low 
level (assistance and ‘knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest 
and reasonable man’).8 Whereas, in the same jurisdiction, A will be liable for procuring, rather 
than assisting, any breach of trust; that is, the stronger conduct and mental elements connoted 
by procurement allow for a less egregious primary wrong.9  
Thirdly, the substantive nature of A’s liability does not depend upon whether the law 
characterises it as liability for a wrong that is separate and distinct from the wrong for which 
PW is liable. This is of significance to our claim: A’s liability is accessorial provided it is both 
necessary and sufficient to prove that A culpably involved herself in PW’s wrongdoing. An 
example of a liability being accessorial in substance but expressed as a different wrong is the 
tort of inducing breach of contract. The liability is a tort for historical and conceptual reasons 
including that only a party to the contract could be liable in contract law.10 But the requisite 
elements for liability are: (i) the commission of a wrong in the form of a breach of contract by 
PW; (ii) A’s involvement in the commission of that wrong through inducement of PW to 
breach; and (iii) that A has the requisite mental state at the time of involvement.11 Thus, the 
liability is accessorial to another’s breach of contract.12  
Accessory liability for the same wrong as committed by PW arises where parties are liable as 
joint tortfeasors. Joint tortfeasors are liable for the same tort as that committed by PW, but on 
a variety of grounds, including vicarious liability of employers and principals.13 Some joint 
tortfeasors are liable on accessorial grounds because it must be shown that they involved 
themselves in another’s tortious conduct with a requisite mental state. For example, if A 
                                                          
5 See Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378, 387; Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, 
[2002] 2 A.C. 164; Abou-Rahmah v Abacha [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1492, [2007] Bus.L.R. 220. See further Part 
IV B 3. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 C.L.R. 89. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See further, Dietrich and Ridge, Accessories, at para. [6.2.1].  
11 Ibid., at ch. 6.  
12 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 A.C. 1.  
13 See Baxter v Obacelo Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 66, (2001) 205 C.L.R. 635 at [24].  
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procured PW, or entered a common design with PW, to commit a tort (such as trespass), but 
did not herself carry out the acts constituting its elements (A did not enter C’s land, for 
example), A’s liability is accessorial even though in form A’s liability is for the same tort (the 
trespass) as PW.14  
The distinction in tort law between liability that is not accessorial, and liability that is, is not 
always easy to draw in practice. For example, where two parties carry out the same act together, 
or carry out parts of a combination of acts that together form the conduct elements of a wrong 
or multiple wrongs, the facts could be analysed either as raising primary liability only, or 
accessory liability where the parties are primary wrongdoers and accessories both at the same 
time.15  Such scenarios pose an unavoidable challenge in distinguishing accessory liability from 
other types of liability and are discussed further at Part III C (5). 
Thus, three features distinguish our preferred conception of accessory liability: the legal 
content of the conduct and mental elements is not fixed and depends upon the purposes and 
values of the law of the primary wrong; there is a proportionality between the primary wrong 
and the conduct and mental elements; and A’s liability can be for a separate wrong or for the 
same wrong for which PW is liable.16  
III. NON-ACCESSORIAL CONCEPTIONS OF LIABILITY  
This Part considers two non-accessorial conceptions of parts of private law that challenge the 
explanatory power and breadth of our preferred conception of accessory liability and that have 
recently come to the fore. They concern equitable accessory liability and the accessory liability 
of joint tortfeasors respectively. First, however, it is necessary to address the terminological 
complexity and confusion that abounds. 
A. Terminology 
                                                          
14 See, e.g., Hume v Oldacre (1816) 1 Starke 351, 171 E.R. 494; Schumann v Abbot [1961] S.A.S.R. 149.  
15 A different problem of distinguishing primary from accessory liability arises in categorising some causes of 
action. For example, the tort of conspiracy largely overlaps with accessory liability, but has a remnant, distinct 
sphere of operation that does not. This means that conspiracy cannot be categorised as a form of accessorial 
liability, though most examples of conspiracy would also, factually, be able to substantiate a claim of joint 
tortfeasance as accessories. See Dietrich and Ridge, Accessories, at para. [5.3.2]. For a more radical reordering of 
the law, see P. Davies and P. Sales, ‘Intentional Harms, Accessories and Conspiracies’ (2018) 134 L.Q.R. 69.  
16 It should also be noted that the fact that a person’s liability is dependent upon another party committing a wrong 
does not mean that the liability is always accessorial. Vicarious liability is an obvious example. Another example 
is that a defendant may be independently liable for negligently failing to prevent a tortfeasor’s tortious conduct 
that harms C. See, e.g., Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 C.L.R. 256, 262. In neither example will the defendants have 
knowingly involved themselves in the third party’s wrongdoing. 
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One significant challenge to developing a comprehensible conception of accessory liability is 
terminological. A variety of terms are used to describe accessory liability or the various tests 
for or elements of it in different areas of private law; many have overlapping, similar or 
identical meanings.17 There is no authorised dictionary for accessory liability and its 
counterparts, yet often courts and commentators assume that there is. Terms such as primary, 
secondary, ancillary, derivative and, indeed, accessory or accessorial, are assumed to have self-
evident meanings when they do not. Worse still, the assumed meanings may be diametrically 
opposed. Courts are also understandably wary of importing novel terminology into established 
areas of law, particularly when such terminology is viewed as the product of academic 
scholarship. Such reluctance is exacerbated in equity, perhaps because of the criminal and 
common law provenances of accessorial terminology.  
Examples of how these terminological challenges affect the cogency of judicial reasoning can 
be found in a recent Australian case concerning knowing participation in dishonest and 
fraudulent breaches of fiduciary duty and the remedy of account of profits. In Lifeplan 
Australia Friendly Society Ltd v Ancient Order of Foresters in Victoria Friendly Society Ltd,18 
the Full Federal Court of Australia was required to determine the requisite causal link for an 
account of profits to be awarded against the knowing participant. The English Court of Appeal 
had considered the same question in relation to the analogous English claim for dishonest 
assistance in breach of trust or fiduciary duty (described by the English court as an ‘accessory 
liability’).19 One reason given by the Full Court for finding the reasoning of the English court 
was not relevant was that, in its view, the Australian liability ‘is not strictly accessorial. It is a 
liability, in Equity, imposed directly on the third party’.20 With respect, this reasoning is flawed 
because it is contrary to High Court of Australia authority that has characterised knowing 
assistance as an independent wrong (that is, ‘imposed directly’ upon A), but nonetheless as an 
accessory liability.21  
                                                          
17 The over-proliferation of terms is a product of the independent development of accessory liability in different 
areas of law.  
18 (2017) 250 F.C.R. 1. An appeal to the High Court of Australia was heard on 12 April 2018 and the appeal was 
allowed as to the quantification of the profit: see Ancient Order of Foresters in Victoria Friendly Society Ltd v 
Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Ltd [2018] HCA 43.  
19 Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk [2014] EWCA (Civ) 908, [2015] Q.B. 499. 
20 Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Ltd v Ancient Order of Foresters in Victoria Friendly Society Ltd (2017) 
250 FCR 1, at [68].  
21 Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 244 C.L.R. 427, 457 at [106]. 
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Only Justice Gageler engaged with terminological issues on the appeal of the Full Court’s 
decision to the High Court.22 His Honour accepted that ‘accessorial’ was a useful description 
of the equitable liability, but preferred to describe the liability as ‘ancillary’.23 A distinction 
was drawn between the two descriptors: ‘accessorial’ was said to emphasise that it is the nature 
of the primary wrong that makes A’s conduct unconscionable, whereas ‘ancillary’ emphasised 
that it is A’s knowing participation that attracts liability ‘to account “as if” a fiduciary’.24 But 
with respect, the meaning of this passage is obscure and the terminology does nothing to 
enhance its clarity . Surely, ‘accessorial’ and ‘ancillary’ are interchangeable terms in this (or 
any other) context? Perhaps ‘ancillary’ is the more neutral descriptor of the two as it has no 
criminal or common law connotations, but that is not the reason given by Gageler J. Thus, to 
say that the liability is ‘ancillary’, rather than ‘accessorial’ tells us very little; those terms do 
not have a settled legal meaning and are used interchangeably in non-legal contexts.   
In the following discussion we note where terminological ambiguity arises. The point of doing 
so is not to insist that others adopt our preferred terminology; rather, it is to highlight the lack 
of transparency regarding the labels used for accessory and related liabilities. It is also 
necessary to identify such ambiguities in order to understand and evaluate the claims being 
made. 
B. An Alternative Conception to Accessory Liability for Breach of Trust or Fiduciary 
Duty: ‘A’ is a Fiduciary 
Equitable liability for procurement or assistance in another’s equitable wrong conforms to the 
conceptual framework for accessory liability set out in Part II. This is uncontroversial and finds 
strong support in the current law in both England and Australia.25   
An alternative conception to that of accessory liability in equity is proposed by Sarah 
Worthington.26 She denies that accessory liability has any role to play here, essentially because 
                                                          
22 Ancient Order of Foresters in Victoria Friendly Society Ltd v Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Ltd [2018] 
HCA 43 at [76]–[77].  
23 Ibid., at [77] citing Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] A.C. 1189 at [9]. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 A.C. 164 (following Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan 
[1995] 2 A.C. 378); Abou-Rahmah v Abacha [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1492, [2007] Bus.L.R. 220 (following Barlow 
Clowes International Ltd (in liq) v Eurotrust International Ltd [2005] UKPC 37, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1476). In 
Australia see Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 244 C.L.R. 427, 457 at [106].  
26 S. Worthington, “Exposing Third-Party Liability in Equity: Lessons from the Limitations Rules” in P.S. Davies 
and J.E. Penner (eds.), Equity, Trusts and Commerce (Oxford 2017), 331. The catalyst and context for 
Worthington’s arguments is the Limitation Act 1980 (UK) and its interpretation by the UK Supreme Court in 
Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10, [2014] A.C. 1189. We do not seek to defend that decision 
in our evaluation of Worthington’s arguments. 
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it is surplus to requirements. She argues that a dishonest assistant or procurer of a breach of 
trust or fiduciary duty is themselves a fiduciary (and also a trustee if they held, or continue to 
hold, trust property). The requirements that we would characterise as accessorial, namely, 
involvement in the primary wrong with the requisite mental state, are used by Worthington to 
justify the imposition of fiduciary – and if A holds trust property, trust – obligations on A. The 
same analysis is applied to knowing recipients and innocent donees of trust property in breach 
of trust. 
To explain why A is a trustee or fiduciary, Worthington unpacks the language of constructive 
trusts that was traditionally used to describe A’s liability. She concludes that constructive 
trustees are: 
simply people owing trustee-like personal obligations in relation to the management of 
another’s property…[T]hey are, in short, fiduciaries, made so by virtue of the personal 
obligations to which they are subject.27 
They are subject to these personal obligations because they have assumed ‘the care or 
management of property known to belong to others.’28 The extent of the obligations (whether 
encompassing fiduciary duties) depends upon the extent to which they know of the terms of 
the original trust or fiduciary relationship.29  
According to Worthington, if a dishonest assistant is subject to trust and fiduciary obligations, 
it makes perfect sense that they are subject to the same extensive remedies as other trustees and 
fiduciaries when they breach those obligations. Moreover, the availability of disgorgement 
remedies such as an account of profits only makes sense if A is a fiduciary. If Worthington is 
correct, then there is virtually no scope for accessory liability in equity: it is a redundant 
concept. 
                                                          
27 Worthington, ‘Exposing Third-Party Liability in Equity’, at p. 338.  
28 Ibid., at p. 341.  
29 Ibid., at pp. 339-340.  
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In the following discussion we identify and evaluate three key elements of Worthington’s 
analysis. Worthington’s reasoning focuses upon liability for dishonest assistance, rather than 
procurement,30 and we will do the same.31  
3. Worthington’s characterisation of the nature of equity 
Worthington’s thesis is premised upon a characterisation of equity as being quintessentially 
about property:  
The key insight is to notice that equity’s unrelenting focus is on property-holding and 
property-management. In particular, equity’s focus is on the property itself, and not on 
the parties with interests in the property or with claims in respect of its mismanagement. 
It is this property focus, rather than a claimant focus, which marks a powerful divide 
between equity and the common law, with some striking consequences.32 
The consequence for those involved in a breach of trust or fiduciary duty is that equity: 
determines the liability of strangers to an express trust, or strangers to the property-
management relationship, very directly: it asks whether these people, too, are trustees 
or fiduciaries or both.33  
Equity’s focus upon property is crucial to Worthington’s reasoning: dishonest assistants are 
fiduciaries because they are either property holders or property managers for others. They 
become liable for knowingly breaching the equitable duties associated with property holding 
and/or management.  
This is a difficult claim to evaluate due to its generality. Nonetheless, a question that 
immediately arises is why Worthington contrasts a ‘property focus’ with a ‘claimant focus’, 
implying that they are the only, mutually exclusive, possibilities? Contrary to Worthington’s 
characterisation of equity as focussed solely on property, courts express the principled 
rationales for dishonest or knowing assistance liability in relational terms. For example, A’s 
                                                          
30 This is due, in our view, to terminological confusion regarding the meaning of ‘primary wrong’. See particularly 
ibid., at p 346 where it is argued that liability for procuring a breach of trust or fiduciary duty cannot be accessory 
liability ‘since the “primary” or instigating wrong is the inducer’s, not the trustee’s or fiduciary’s’. This is a novel 
use of ‘primary’ and misunderstands its meaning in the context of ‘primary wrong’. The adjective ‘primary’ in its 
ordinary use does not describe the chronology of wrongdoing or how the wrong originated, but rather the origin 
of C’s rights against PW and A. 
31 We will not evaluate the force or otherwise of her reasoning as it applies to recipient liability or to the liability 
of innocent donees of misappropriated trust property. The case for assimilating these liabilities with trust and 
fiduciary law is stronger than that for assistance-based liability because of the requisite trust property element.  
32 Worthington, ‘Exposing Third-Party Liability in Equity’, at pp. 332-333. 
33 Ibid., at pp. 345. 
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culpability is described in terms of A knowingly taking advantage for personal gain of the 
equitable relationship between the claimant beneficiary or principal, C and PW,34 or 
deliberately interfering in the relationship between C and PW.35 There are also pragmatic 
rationales for liability: these do indeed include the protection of trust property,36 but also the 
objectives of deterring breaches of trust and fiduciary duty by dissuading others from 
participating in such breaches,37 and the vindication of C’s rights by providing C with an 
alternative defendant in A.38  
Even if we attempt, as Worthington does, to extract abstract propositions from the case law 
that are not necessarily supported by what judges say they are doing, her characterisation of 
equity does not resonate with the operation of current English or Australian law. Equity’s 
jurisdiction is founded upon ‘conscience’, not property per se; and equitable intervention 
ranges far beyond property-related scenarios.39 The undoubted presence of a large and complex 
body of equity concerning the management of trusts and trust property does not mean that the 
equitable norms at play are focused solely upon the inviolability of such property.  
A further and more obvious problem with a property-focussed analysis is that property-related 
wrongdoing is not a prerequisite for either breach of fiduciary duty or knowing assistance or 
procurement liability. That is, misappropriation of trust property – including property under 
the control of a fiduciary, such as corporate property – is not an essential element for A’s 
liability. Where there is no property involved, Worthington’s claim that ‘[i]n equity, however, 
the relationship under the microscope is not that between the accessory and the primary 
wrongdoer; it is the relationship between the accessory and the managed property’40 does not 
make sense. Despite obiter comments in the House of Lords and UK Supreme Court that 
apparently assume that the primary wrong will involve misapplication of trust property,41 the 
English Court of Appeal has directly considered the question, in the (non-property-related) 
                                                          
34 See, eg, Fyffes Group Ltd v Templeman [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 643, 669; Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk 
[2014] EWCA (Civ) 908, [2015] Q.B. 499 at [76] (citing Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd 
(1975) 132 C.L.R. 373, 397).  
35 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378, 386-387.  
36 See, e.g., Zhu v Treasurer of New South Wales (2004) 218 C.L.R. 530, at [120]-[121]. 
37 Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk [2014] EWCA (Civ) 908, [2015] Q.B. 499, [76] (citing Consul Development 
Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 C.L.R. 373, 397). 
38 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378, 386-387.  
39 Lord Millett, ‘The Common Lawyer and the Equity Practitioner’ (2015) 6 UK Supreme Court Yearbook 175, 
179.  
40 Worthington, ‘Exposing Third-Party Liability in Equity’, at p. 345. 
41 See, eg, Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 A.C. 164 at [107] (Lord Millett): ‘liability for 
misdirected funds’; Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10, [2014] A.C. 1189 at [9] (Lord Sumption 
JSC, Lord Hughes JSC agreeing): ‘participation in the unlawful misapplication of trust assets’.  
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context of a fiduciary taking bribes to enter certain contracts on behalf of his principal, and 
found otherwise:  
[I]n a case for accessory liability there is no requirement for there to be trust property. 
Such a requirement wrongly associates accessory liability with trust concepts … 
Accessory liability does not involve a trust. It involves providing dishonest assistance 
to somebody else who is in a fiduciary capacity [and] has committed a breach of his 
fiduciary duties.42 
It is also clear in Australia that equitable liability for knowing assistance in a dishonest and 
fraudulent design can arise whether or not the primary wrong involves a misappropriation of 
trust property.43 Moreover, how does one explain the occurrence of accessory liability for 
breach of confidence, admittedly narrow as it is, if there must be property involved?44 In 
summary, Worthington’s characterisation of equity as being focussed upon property and hence 
mandating the direct imposition of trust or fiduciary property-related obligations on knowing 
assistants is unpersuasive. 
4. Conservatism regarding equitable remedies 
Worthington’s reasoning reflects her concern regarding the intrusion of equitable remedies into 
commercial dealings. A repeated theme of her argument is that the dishonest assistant is subject 
to the same range of remedies as a trustee or fiduciary and the only way that this can be justified 
is if the dishonest assistant is actually a trustee or fiduciary. The implication is that equitable 
remedies are disruptive and must be kept in check. In particular, Worthington is troubled by 
the availability of an account of profits, which, she says, is ‘remarkably rare’ outside fiduciary 
law:45  
So when dishonest assistants are compelled to disgorge the personal gains derived from 
non-compliance with particular property-management duties, as they are, then 
                                                          
42 Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk [2014] EWCA (Civ) 908, [2015] Q.B. 499 [91] (Longmore, Moore-Bick 
and Lewison LJJ) quoting JD Wetherspoon plc v Van de Berg & Co Ltd [2009] EWHC 639 at [510]-[520] 
(Peter Smith J). See further Dietrich and Ridge, Accessories, at para. [8.3.1.3]. 
43 Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 C.L.R. 373; Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v 
Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) C.L.R. 89.  
44 Cf., Vestergaard Frandsen A/S v Bestnet Europe Ltd [2013] UKSC 31, [2013] 1 W.L.R. 1556. See also, OBG 
Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] A.C. 1 at [276].  
45 Worthington, ‘Exposing Third-Party Liability in Equity’, at p. 343.  
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classification of these people as fiduciaries seems irresistible, notwithstanding the 
courts’ explicit denial of that conclusion.46  
This downplays the fact that an account of profits clearly is available in non-fiduciary contexts, 
such as intellectual property47 and breach of confidence.48 Indeed, the remedy is not 
controversial in those contexts. This does not mean, however, that those forms of liability need 
to be (re)-characterised as fiduciary. It is also not clear why the availability of the full range of 
equitable remedies against an accessory is unjustified. Why, for instance, is it unthinkable that 
a fiduciary’s spouse who is complicit in the fiduciary’s wrongful diversion of profits from the 
principal to her should be liable to disgorge those profits on the accessorial basis of dishonest 
assistance in the fiduciary’s breach of duty? The courts clearly do recognise the availability of 
an account of profits for knowing or dishonest assistance liability49 and, as discussed above, 
the principled rationales for such liability clearly encompass gain-motivated conduct.  
5. Is accessory liability an ‘additional loop’? 
A third key element of Worthington’s reasoning is that her thesis is direct and simple,50 whereas 
an accessory liability analysis is an ‘additional loop’.51 But is this so? On Worthington’s 
approach it is first necessary to prove that: 
1. A ‘assumed the care or management of property’; 
2. ‘known to belong to others’. 
At this point, it is established that A was a fiduciary and perhaps also a trustee. It is then 
necessary to prove that there was: 
3. a subsequent breach of trust or fiduciary duty by A.52  
In order to establish accessory liability, one must also prove three elements, namely: 
(i) the primary wrong of breach of fiduciary duty by PW; 
                                                          
46 Ibid. 
47 See eg Patents Act 1977 (UK), s. 61; Dart Industries Inc v Decor Corporation Pty Ltd (1993) 179 C.L.R. 101.  
48 Peter Pan Manufacturing Corp v Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1964] 1 W.L.R. 96, 106; OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] 
UKHL 21, [2008] A.C. 1 at [276]. 
49 Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk [2014] EWCA (Civ) 908, [2015] Q.B. 499:  Ancient Order of Foresters in 
Victoria Friendly Society Ltd v Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Ltd [2018] HCA 43. See also Michael Wilson 
& Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 244 C.L.R. 427, 457 at [106].  
50 See eg Worthington, ‘Exposing Third-Party Liability in Equity’, at pp. 357-358. See further Part IV below 
concerning the prioritisation of uniformity and simplicity in the law.  
51 Worthington, ‘Exposing Third-Party Liability in Equity’, at p. 345. 
52 Ibid., at pp. 339-340. 
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(ii) A’s involvement through conduct in the primary wrong; and  
(iii) that A had the requisite mental state.  
Since the subject-matter of elements 1. and 2. of Worthington’s framework, concerning A’s 
conduct and knowledge, equates to the subject-matter of elements (ii) and (iii) of our 
accessorial framework, on either approach three distinct elements must be established for 
liability to arise: a conduct and mental element, as well as a wrong (whether by the original 
fiduciary on Worthington’s approach or by A on our approach). Worthington’s conception of 
A’s liability is no more direct or simpler. 
In summary, to conceive of dishonest assistants as fiduciaries in their own right, rather than as 
accessories, does not reflect either the scope of the liability (which goes beyond property-
related scenarios) or the principled rationales for liability (which are relational) or the range of 
pragmatic rationales (which include, but are not limited to, property-protection). It reflects a 
distrust of gain-based remedies which, in our view, is ungrounded. Nor does the fiduciary route 
to liability prove simpler. Finally, as Worthington candidly acknowledges, much of her analysis 
is contrary to the language and the reasoning of the courts. Surely that must give one pause for 
thought? Why would the courts have got it so wrong?53 And, if Worthington is correct, how 
can this be remedied?  
C. Attribution of Acts, Attribution of Liability, or Accessory Liability? 
1. Introduction 
A second challenge to our preferred conception of accessory liability in private law comes from 
an alternative explanation for certain liabilities in tort law. In brief, it is claimed that the tort 
liability of one who acts in concert with another (or procures another) to commit a tort, and 
where only the latter commits the conduct element of the tort, is based upon the attribution of 
the latter’s acts to the former. Because the attribution is of acts, rather than liability, the 
former’s joint tortfeasor liability is said to be a ‘primary’ liability which is personal to that 
tortfeasor, as opposed to a ‘derivative’ liability which depends upon the actual actor (whom we 
would call the primary wrongdoer) being liable. This characterisation of the liability casts 
doubt on its accessorial nature.  
                                                          
53 We acknowledge that the traditional language of constructive trusts may be used to support Worthington’s 
analysis, however, that language is equally supportive of an accessorial analysis: Dietrich and Ridge, Accessories, 
at para. [8.1.7].  
14 
 
Robert Stevens is a proponent of this view54 and it now appears to have been endorsed by 
important obiter statements from a 2017 High Court of Australia decision, IL v The Queen.55 
Stevens has argued, in support of his rights theory, that there is no accessory liability in tort 
law, but rather that joint tortfeasor liability is explicable in terms of the attribution of one 
person’s act to another.56 This supports Stevens’ thesis that only those who infringe others’ 
rights should be legally liable: ‘The attribution of X’s actions to D means that D has infringed 
C’s rights.’57 There is no right that others not act as an accessory in tort law (unlike the position 
in equity, according to Stevens). . On this reasoning, the joint tortfeasor is liable as another 
principal, and not an accessory.58 
Stevens’ views find implicit support in IL v The Queen. The case concerned criminal joint 
enterprise liability, a form of criminal complicity liability.59 The statements by the plurality in 
IL, concerning the private law liabilities with which we are concerned here, were obiter and 
brief, but it is necessary to unpack their meaning in some depth. We begin with an explanation 
of attribution as a general tool of legal reasoning. We then discuss IL: the legal context, the 
plurality’s obiter statements, and their implications for our conception of accessory liability. 
We then explain our concerns with the ‘attribution conception’ of joint tortfeasor liability and 
why accessory liability is a more illuminating explanation for the relevant areas of joint 
tortfeasor liability. It will be necessary at several points in the following discussion to clarify 
what is meant by labels – such as ‘primary’ and ‘derivative’ – in the particular context. 
2. Attribution as a general tool of legal reasoning  
Attribution occurs in law whenever the conduct, mental state and/or liability of one person is 
treated as being that of another person.60 Attribution of conduct and/or mental state is most 
common in scenarios involving agency, particularly in relation to companies; indeed, for the 
obvious reason that a company can only operate through human agents, it is essential when 
determining a company’s conduct or mental state.61 The rationale for attribution-based 
reasoning is self-evident there. Attribution of conduct and/or mental state assists in determining 
whether the elements of a cause of action are made out against a company (or other principal).  
                                                          
54 See R. Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford 2007). 
55 IL v The Queen [2017] HCA 27, (2017) 262 C.L.R 268.  
56 See Stevens, Torts and Rights, at pp. 275-276 and 256-257. 
57  Ibid at p. 262. 
58 Ibid., at p. 257. 
59 Miller v R [2016] HCA 30, (2016) 259 C.L.R. 380 (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ).  
60 See generally, Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir (No 2) [2015] UKSC 23, [2016] A.C. 1.  
61 Ibid. 
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Alternatively, the liability of one person may be attributed to another. This is one understanding 
of vicarious liability: an employee’s liability in negligence, for example, is attributed to the 
employer such that the employer is liable for negligence without having personally been 
negligent itself.62 Attribution of liability here derives from the employment relationship and is 
justified by reference to policy factors relating to loss-allocation within that context. 
3. IL v The Queen 
The question in IL was whether the accused was guilty of the murder or manslaughter of the 
deceased who died as the result of an accident in the course of their criminal joint enterprise.63 
The plurality (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ) found that as a matter of statutory 
interpretation the accused could not be liable for the murder of the deceased.64 Their Honours 
then went on, in obiter, to consider the operation of criminal joint enterprise liability. They 
explained that the liability involves the attribution of acts to an accused: 
when two or more persons act in concert to effect a common criminal purpose, it is the 
acts of each person to effect their common purpose which are attributed to the others.65 
This is uncontroversial so far as the criminal law is concerned, however, the same principle 
was said to apply in private law (‘civil cases’) to joint tortfeasors:  
The important point is that it is the acts which are attributed from one person (the actor) 
to another who shares the common purpose and, by attribution, becomes personally 
responsible for the acts. It is not the liability of the actor which is attributed.66 
                                                          
62 Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 A.C. 224, and see Paula Giliker, 
Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2010) p 15, concluding that 
attribution of liability is the dominant view in the UK; but contra. Stevens, Torts and Rights, at pp. 257ff who 
concedes that the attribution of liability is the current judicial position, but argues for the attribution of acts model. 
See also, R Stevens, “Vicarious Liability or Vicarious Action?” (2007) 123 L.Q.R. 30. The UK Supreme Court’s 
recent efforts at fundamentally reframing vicarious liability to produce ‘a modern theory of vicarious liability’ (in 
the words of Lord Reed in Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] A.C. 660 at [24] describing the 
Supreme Court’s decision in The Catholic Child Welfare Society v Various Claimants and the Institute of the 
Brothers of the Christian Schools [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 A.C. 1) have focused on where the boundaries of 
liability should be drawn. They have not revisited the older debate as to the competing merits of theories of 
vicarious liability that concern the attribution of liability versus attribution of acts. See also, e.g., Paula Giliker, 
‘Analysing Institutional Liability for Sexual Abuse in England and Wales and Australia: Vicarious Liability, Non-
Delegable Duties and Statutory Intervention’ (2018) 77(3) Cambridge Law Journal 506-538. In Australia see, 
e.g., Kable v State of New South Wales (2012) 268 F.L.R. 1, 18-19 at [52]-[53]. However, recently the question 
was said to still be open in Australia: Pioneer Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v Columbus Capital Pty Ltd [2016] 
FCAFC 78 at [48]-[58] (Davies, Gleeson and Edelman JJ). 
63 See Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s. 18.  
64 IL v The Queen [2017] HCA 27, (2017) 262 C.L.R. 268 at [25]. 
65 Ibid., at para. [2]. See also para. [26]. See also Andrew Dyer, ‘The “Australian Position” Concerning Criminal 
Complicity: Principle, Policy or Politics’ (2018) 40 Sydney Law Review 289, 294. 
66 Ibid., at para. [29].  
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Their Honours went on to locate their statements regarding attribution within the context of a 
distinction, often drawn in the criminal law, between ‘primary liability’ and ‘derivative 
liability’:67  
Liability which is primary can involve attribution of the acts of another. But the liability 
remains personal to the accused. Liability which is derivative depends upon attribution 
to the accused of the liability of another. If the other is not liable then the accused cannot 
be made liable.68  
Two observations are pertinent before going further. First, the nature and precise operation of 
criminal joint enterprise liability are contested and differ across jurisdictions; its relationship 
to other complicity doctrines such as criminal aiding and abetting liability is unclear.69 With 
respect, it seems odd to use an obiter discussion of this liability as a springboard for generic 
statements about the conceptual foundations of civil law. The second observation relates to 
terminology. The potential for confusion is considerable here because ‘primary’ and 
‘derivative’ have various meanings in accessory liability discourse as well as a very specific 
meaning in criminal complicity discourse. ‘Primary’ is used by the plurality in IL to describe 
joint tortfeasor liability (said to be based on the attribution of acts) as being personal to a 
defendant. And ‘derivative’ is used to describe liability which has been attributed to the 
defendant. It is correct that a joint tortfeasor is always liable as principal for the same primary 
wrong as committed by the other tortfeasor. But this type of liability (for the same wrong as 
another) is often also described in the context of private law as ‘derivative’ (or ‘secondary’), 
since it is for the same, and not a different, wrong as committed by PW.70 That is, the same 
term (‘derivative’) has completely opposite meanings in the same context (and can also mean 
the same as ‘primary’), depending upon whether one is speaking from a criminal law 
perspective or from a particular conceptual perspective within private law. Thus, what appears 
                                                          
67 Ibid., at para. [30] (citing Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316, 341-342 at [71]). 
68 Ibid., at para. [34] citing Pioneer Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v Columbus Capital Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 78 at 
[48]-[56]. See also Gageler J at para. [103] (agreeing that acts are attributed for purposes of joint criminal liability) 
but at para. [107], leaving open whether extended joint criminal enterprise liability is primary or derivative. 
Contrast Bell and Nettle JJ at para. [65], who conclude that it is only the acts of the other party that comprise the 
actus reus of an offence, that are to be attributed. 
69 As to whether (1) joint criminal enterprise is a form of accessory liability and (2) the level of fault that is required 
to establish is the same as it is for aiding and abetting accessory liability, see Jogee v R [2016] UKSC 8, [2016] 2 
All E.R. 1; R v Ruddock [2016] UKPC 7, [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681 (on joint appeal, answering yes to both questions); 
contrast Miller v The Queen (2016) 259 C.L.R. 380 and Hksar v Chan Kam Shing [2016] HKCFA 87, all 
answering no to both questions. See further A. Simester, ‘Accessory Liability and Common Unlawful Purpose’ 
(2017) 133 L.Q.R. 73.  
70 See, e.g., S. Elliott and C. Mitchell, “Remedies for Dishonest Assistance” (2004) 67 Modern Law Review 16; 
P. Sales, “The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil Secondary Liability” (1990) 49 C.L.J. 491, 502ff. 
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to be a very simple and straightforward statement by the plurality is easily capable of being 
misconstrued.  
4. Implications of attribution-based reasoning for an accessorial conception of the law 
What are the implications of Stevens’ attribution thesis, seemingly endorsed in the High Court, 
for our accessorial conception of the liability of joint tortfeasors who procure or act in concert 
to commit a tort? Although it is not spelt out in the plurality’s statement, a logical consequence 
of the argument that the attribution of one person (X)’s acts to another (Y) makes the latter 
personally and primarily liable (subject to other elements of the offence/wrong being satisfied), 
is that Y’s liability is not amenable to an accessorial analysis. This is because Y personally 
satisfies the elements of the wrong, through attribution of X’s acts regardless of whether X, 
having committed the requisite acts, has also personally satisfied all the elements of the wrong 
(that is, X may not have committed a wrong at all).71 The attribution of acts thesis drives a 
characterisation of the liability as non-accessorial; this is clearly spelt out in Stevens’ work, 
even if not made explicit by the High Court. Hence, the challenge to any conception of 
accessory liability in its application to joint tortfeasors72 is twofold. First, does the attribution 
of acts explanation for that liability render our accessorial explanation redundant? Secondly, 
as there can be no accessory liability without there being a primary wrong, does the reasoning 
in IL suggest that the liability of joint tortfeasors cannot be conceptualised as accessorial in any 
event,73 because sometimes the party whose acts are attributed may not have committed any 
wrong? 
5. The shortcomings of attribution reasoning  
Attribution reasoning is undoubtedly an important tool in the law.  For example, attribution in 
relation to agents and principals is clearly justified, based on their pre-existing relationship; the 
existence of a pre-existing employment relationship (or perhaps, one akin to employment) also 
explains vicarious liability, though whether that is based on the attribution of employees’ acts, 
or of employees’ liability, is contested.  However, the use of attribution reasoning in relation 
to all cases of joint tortfeasors, including where accessorial conduct is at issue, glosses over the 
reason for attribution in the distinct and separate contexts. The reasons for attributing acts 
(accepting that analysis for present purposes) of an employee or agent to the employer or 
                                                          
71 Stevens, Torts and Rights, at p. 257.  
72 Evaluation of the plurality’s statements in IL as they apply to forms of criminal accessory liability is beyond 
the scope of this article.  
73 Cf., Stevens, Torts and Rights, at p. 256.  
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principal, do not necessarily translate to the attribution of acts of the procured to the procurer, 
or the party to a common design who commits the tort, to the one who does not. Any theory of 
attribution needs to explain the reasons for attribution in those very different circumstances. If 
one goes behind the language of attribution and unpacks the justifications for its application to 
joint tortfeasors, it becomes apparent that where Y has not personally committed the relevant 
acts constituting the wrong, the only reason for attribution is because of Y’s involvement in 
X’s wrongful scheme (whether procuring it, perhaps as an assistant to it,74 or conspiring with 
X to commit the scheme and taking steps to carry it out). Of necessity, one must show wrongful 
conduct by X (regardless of whether X may not be liable in the event, to which matter we turn 
to in the next section). In other words, it is an accessorial analysis in this factual context that 
tells us why we might attribute one person’s acts to another. The argument that the attribution 
of one person’s acts (X) to another (Y) makes the latter personally and primarily liable, and 
therefore not an accessory, conceals what is, in substance, an accessorial analysis.  
It might be argued that in some factual scenarios it will be very difficult to distinguish who is 
an accessory and who is a primary wrongdoer, whereas an attribution of acts conception of 
liability avoids such niceties by attributing each parties’ acts to the other.75 For example, where 
two parties both commit the same act together at the same time (say, by both pushing someone) 
or agree to commit different parts of a chain of actions (say, by agreeing that one pushes 
someone and the other trips them), thereby committing a tort or torts, it is not obvious whether 
an accessorial or primary liability arises. It is true that it is difficult to distinguish, at times, 
accessory liability from true primary liability, although this is not an issue confined to 
accessory liability: it is often the case that a factual scenario gives rise to more than one, 
sometimes overlapping, liability. We may well say each party has committed the one primary 
wrong, including for pragmatic reasons, where it is difficult to disentangle the conduct.76  
Alternatively, in criminal law, English common law draws the distinction between primary 
liability and accessory liability by asking whether a party, D, has contributed by his or her own 
acts, ‘as distinct from anything done by [the principal offender] with D’s assistance …, to the 
                                                          
74 Whether mere assistance alone suffices in tort law as a conduct element for accessory liability in tort law is still 
an open question, though the UKSC’s decision in Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] UKSC 10, [2015] 
A.C. 1229 would seem to suggest that assistance only suffices if a further element of a common design is made 
out, but does not spell out what further conduct (or mental state) is needed to establish such design. 
75 We are indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers for this point.  
76  One can then go on to argue that if the agreement, or joint or mutual intention of the parties, is the underlying 
rationale for such attribution, then such attribution also applies to Y even where X alone has performed all the 
conduct elements of an offence or wrong, so long as X acted as part of the agreed plan with Y. 
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actus reus’.77 If D did so, then he or she is a principal offender; if not, then D can only be an 
accessory. That test may not be perfect, but nonetheless it is a reasonable starting point.  
Every theory faces these difficult exercises in line-drawing. For example, the plurality in IL v 
The Queen drew a distinction between the attribution of acts (referring to complicity) and the 
attribution of liabilities (referring to aiding and abetting).78  But where does one draw the line 
between complicity and aiding and abetting, given that the former can be implied from acts of 
assistance, and that factually, there exists a spectrum of possible acts of involvement of one 
party in another’s wrongdoing including: procuring another; conspiring with another in clear, 
express plans; impliedly conspiring; being an active and dominant assistant; to being a reluctant 
minor player in another’s wrongful activity?79 
In our view, neither the attribution of acts (or, for that matter, of liability) adequately explains 
why an accessory is liable; indeed, only accessorial reasoning explains why attribution (if it is 
needed) occurs when it does. An accessory is liable for her own culpable conduct in involving 
herself, with a requisite mental element, in PW’s wrongful conduct. Notions of attribution are 
not needed in that context and in private law, accessorial liabilities are not generally described 
in those terms.  
6. Must PW be liable for the wrongful conduct? 
Still problematic for the utility of our conception of accessory liability, however, is the second 
question raised by the plurality’s statements in IL: how can parties be accessories to others’ 
‘wrongs’ if those others are not themselves liable for those wrongs — in short, are not 
wrongdoers? 80 The question is pertinent to all accessory liabilities regardless of the form of 
liability (whether for the same or a different wrong to that of PW).  
The plurality’s distinction in IL between ‘primary’ liability (including where PW’s acts are 
attributed to A) and ‘derivative’ (attributed) liability was made in the context of joint criminal 
                                                          
77  See David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th ed (Oxford University Press, 2011) at p. 190. 
Compare R v Gnango [2011] UKSC 59; [2012] 1 A.C. 827 at [129] (Lord Kerr) and see R v Kennedy (No. 2) 
[2007] UKHL 38; [2008] Crim L.R. 223. This is also the position under Australian Criminal Code states (see, eg, 
R v Sherrington and Kuchler [2001] QCA 105), but is contrary to the position at Australian common law: see, 
e.g., Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 C.L.R 316. 
78  [2017] HCA 27, (2017) 262 C.L.R. 268 at [2], [26], [29]. 
79  As Simester, ‘Accessory Liability and Common Unlawful Purpose’, 77, states, it is ‘entirely sensible’ that a 
conspirator in a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) is viewed as an accomplice (or aider and abettor) for the crime 
agreed to. The conspiracy is itself a form of participation. He takes this view while defending a distinct approach 
to extended JCE liability where a further and different crime is committed. 
80 This is a different question to whether a claim needs to have been brought against PW, the answer to which is 
unproblematic: no.  
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enterprise liability, which their Honours considered to be a form of primary liability; they were 
contrasting criminal aiding and abetting (accessory) liability which they considered to be 
derivative. The plurality concluded that in the latter type of liability, an ‘accessory’ is only 
liable if the principal offender is liable. However, although this is seemingly the accepted 
position in criminal law, even here, the conclusion is contestable, and courts have struggled to 
avoid the consequences of applying such a principle in a range of factual circumstances.81 It is 
clear that if a party involves herself in an offence committed by an offender who, say, 
successfully pleads a defence of insanity or automatism, such party will be found liable.82 There 
are different explanations that might be given for such liability. Their Honours in IL sought to 
explain such decisions as either being cases of joint criminal enterprises83 or as cases of 
‘innocent agency’;84 but those explanations may in some cases be strained on the facts or in 
logic,85 and some courts have found that aiding and abetting liability can and should arise even 
where PW is not liable.86 
Irrespective of the position at criminal law, however, we would argue that in private law an 
accessory can be liable even if PW is not because, for example, PW can establish an excuse. 
Although this seems illogical — how can A be involved in PW’s ‘wrong’ if PW has not 
committed a ‘wrong’? —PW must still have engaged in the wrongful conduct. In other words, 
A can be liable for involvement in PW’s putative wrong, even if PW herself is excused by 
                                                          
81 Certainly, the opposite appears to be the position in English law. See, e.g., Bourne v R (1952) 36 Cr.App.R 125; 
R v Austin [1981] 1 All E.R. 374; R v Cogan [1976] Q.B. 217. The ‘no liability for one, no liability for the other’ 
rule is also undermined by the fact that for aiding and abetting liability, in Australian common law, an accused 
can be found liable for a more serious offence than the principal offender. See, e.g., Likiardopoulos v R (2012) 
247 C.L.R. 265. 
82 Similarly, where a young child lacking capacity commits an ‘offence’: see Schultz v Pettitt (1980) 25 S.A.S.R. 
427. Some statutory schemes are explicit on the point: eg, Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s. 11.2(5).  
83 This may require a reinterpretation of cases contrary to the reasons actually given: see the explanation of the 
English cases cited at n 77 above by McHugh J in Osland v R (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316 and IL v The Queen [2017] 
HCA 27, (2017) 262 C.L.R. 268 at [34]-[40] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ) as being based on joint criminal 
enterprise, rather than aiding and abetting (accessory) liability. Compare Bell and Nettle JJ in IL at para. [83]-
[88].  
84 The term ‘innocent agency’ is of uncertain meaning and the limitations that apply to that principle are not clear 
and therefore that concept is not necessarily helpful as an explanatory concept. Further, the term can be used to 
refer to two, sometimes not easily distinguishable, situations. These are (1) where the defendant is an accessory 
to an (excused) wrongful act, eg, probably where an insane person decides to kill X and A aids him by providing 
him with poison: G. Williams, “Theory of Excuses” (1982) Criminal Law Review 732, particularly at pp. 735-
738 (the accused is not an accountable agent but the underlying wrongfulness of the conduct is not removed); or 
(2) where the defendant is the only principal offender against whom all elements of the offence can be made out, 
albeit perhaps through indirect conduct (e.g., defendant gives X food to feed victim that unbeknownst to X is 
poisoned: c.f. R v Michael (1840) 9 C&P 356, 173 E.R. 867). Compare the discussion of innocent agency in IL v 
The Queen [2017] HCA 27, (2017) 262 C.L.R 268 at [81]-[88] (Bell and Nettle JJ). 
85 See Williams, ‘Theory of Excuses’, at p. 737. 
86 See cases cited in n 77 above, and note also Gibbs J in Matusevich v R (1977) 137 C.L.R. 633, 636. Compare 
Gibbs J in White v Ridley (1978) 140 C.L.R. 342, 346-347. 
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some defence or reason personal to herself.87 That position seems to apply in cases of accessory 
liability that is independent, in equity and common law,88 but also probably applies even where 
the accessory is liable for the same wrong as the primary wrongdoer in tort.89 Of course, if a 
defence takes away the inherent wrongfulness of PW’s conduct altogether such that no wrong 
at all has been committed (such as self-defence, or consent), then accessory liability rightly 
cannot arise.  
IV. UNIFORMITY AND SIMPLIFICATION: ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF 
ACCESSORY LIABILITY ITSELF 
A. Introduction 
A different challenge to the utility of the concept of accessory liability in private law comes 
from commentators who seek to simplify the law by elevating accessory liability to a uniform 
cause of action. Attempts at simplification tend to prioritise clarity and logic in the expression 
of the law over fidelity to the reasoning of the courts and to the ‘disorderliness’90 that is a by-
product of our legal system. In this Part we argue that conceptions of accessory liability that 
prioritise uniformity and simplicity risk distorting the law and may lead to unjust outcomes. 
We begin by describing the uniformity approach and, specifically, key elements of the 
conceptual framework proposed by Paul Davies.91 We then explain three concerns with 
Davies’ approach. The first is a general concern relating to its lack of ‘fit’ with statutory 
accessory liability schemes. The second and third concerns relate to claims that are central to 
Davies’ analysis: first, that the conduct and mental elements of an accessory liability claim 
must be considered in isolation from each other; and secondly (and relatedly), that there should 
be a uniform requirement of subjective actual knowledge.  
B. A Uniform Conception of Accessory Liability in Private Law 
1. Introduction 
                                                          
87 See Dietrich and Ridge, Accessories, at para. [3.6].  
88 E.g., for inducing breach of contract, the breaching party need not be liable, either because the contract is 
unenforceable or because the breaching party has excluded the liability to pay damages for breach. See Dietrich 
and Ridge, Accessories, at para. [6.3.2]. Similarly, in equity a trustee’s liability for breach of trust might be 
excused, whereas the procurer of the breach would remain liable. See also Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v 
Nicholls (2011) 244 C.L.R. 427.  
89 See the operation of defences based on the absence of malice in defamation law, which only apply as against 
those joint tortfeasors who are activated by malice but not against the others: see Cornwall v Rowan [2004] SASC 
384 at [452] and Egger v The Viscount Chelmsford (1965) 1 Q.B. 248, 265. 
90 Fistar v Riverwood Legion and Community Club Limited (2016) 91 N.S.W.L.R. 732, 743-744 at [48]-[53] 
(Leeming JA).  
91 P.S. Davies, Accessory Liability (Oxford 2015). 
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Peter Birks once called for ‘one law on the civil liability of accessories’.92 That call was heeded 
by Davies in his book Accessory Liability,93  developing upon an attempt by Philip Sales to 
identify uniform accessory rules.94 Davies describes the framework of accessory liability in 
broadly similar terms to us, namely, (1) that a primary wrong is established and (2) that the 
accessory ‘did something in relation to the primary wrong (the conduct element) and (3) was 
at fault in some way (the mental element)’.95 However, unlike our conception of the framework 
as being dynamic in operation and fluid in content, Davies calls for it to be applied in a fixed 
and uniform manner. Davies’ view is that the framework operates as a generic cause of action, 
rather than as an organising principle:  
A general principle of knowing assistance or inducement should apply regardless of the 
nature of the primary right of the claimant that has been infringed.96  
Accordingly, Davies insists upon a fixed mental element: subjective actual knowledge 
(including wilful blindness97) by A of PW’s commission of the wrong is essential.98 Davies 
concludes thus:  
The law should be easy to state, even if, at times, difficult to prove: only a defendant 
who knowingly assists a primary wrong risks accessory liability.99 
He concedes that this requires substantial changes to the law.100 
2. Accommodating statutory accessory liabilities  
One difficulty with Davies’ approach is that his  book concerns the doctrines of equity, contract 
and tort, which means that he engages with statute only peripherally.101 The ubiquity of statute 
                                                          
92 P. Birks, “Civil Wrongs: A New World” in F.M.B. Reynolds and P. Birks (eds.) Butterworth Lectures 1990-91 
(London 1992) 100.  
93 Davies, Accessory Liability. Davies’ book was published too late for us evaluate it in Dietrich and Ridge, 
Accessories. 
94 Sales, “The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil Secondary Liability”. 
95 Davies, Accessory Liability, at p. 1. 
96 Ibid., at p. 283. 
97 Ibid., at p. 283: ‘[C]onsciously turning a blind eye to known facts’. 
98 Ibid., at pp. 44-47, 53, ch. 9. 
99 Ibid., at p. 285. 
100 Ibid., at p. 283. 
101 Recently, Sir Richard Arnold and Davies have called for legislation to be amended to delete specific provisions 
that impose accessory liability on the basis of different (statutory) principles rather than on general tortious 
accessory principles. Sir R. Arnold and P. Davies, “Accessory Liability for Intellectual Property Infringement: 
The Case of Authorisation” (2017) 133 L.Q.R. 442, particularly at 443-444, 466-468 (arguing for the removal of 
statutory liability for ‘authorising’ a breach of copyright so as to provide for uniform accessory rules). Their 
assumption is that the outcomes of the application of the two distinct tests would be the same. That may be an 
arguable proposition in English law, but is improbable in Australian law. See, eg, Career Step, LLC v TalentMed 
Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 132 (Robertson J). 
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in modern private law and, specifically, the many instances of statutory liability that conform 
to an accessorial conceptual framework, presents a challenge for a uniformity-driven 
conception of accessory liability that focuses only on judge-made doctrines developed at 
common law or in equity102 However, that very ubiquity demands that statute be 
accommodated.  
Our conception of accessory liability can and does accommodate statute because the content 
and relationship of the elements of liability are not fixed. This, we suggest, is of more value to 
legislators and law reformers than a prescriptive conception that prioritises uniformity, 
regardless of context.103 The dynamic operation of our framework encompasses all 
manifestations of accessory liability across private law and can provide a wealth of data on 
how such questions might be answered in a holistic manner with due regard for the particular 
policy and legal context. Furthermore, such an approach may also yield insights as to the 
resolution of intractable problems in judge-made law; the insights to be gained are not all one-
way.104  
3. The dynamic relationship of the elements of accessory liability  
As explained in Part II, there is a dynamic interplay between the conduct and mental elements 
of the preferred conception for accessory liability. A’s culpability reflects A’s conduct and 
mental state in combination and having regard to the primary wrong committed. As a general 
rule, the more active A is in bringing about the primary wrong, the less A may need to know 
about PW’s planned wrongdoing in order to be liable; the less active A is, then the more 
detailed information A will probably need to know and to a higher degree in order to be liable. 
Where both elements are weak, the case for liability is also weak. Also relevant are the 
egregiousness of the primary wrong and the purposes and values that underpin that primary 
                                                          
102 See M. Leeming, “Theories and Principles Underlying the Development of the Common Law – The Statutory 
Elephant in the Room” (2013) 36 UNSW Law Journal 1002; R. Grantham and D. Jensen, “Coherence in the Age 
of Statutes” (2016) 42 Monash University law Review 360. 
103 Cf., D. Foxton, “Accessory Liability and Section 213 Insolvency Act 1986” [2018] Journal of Business Law 
324.  
104 A. Burrows, “The Relationship Between Common Law and Statute in the Law of Obligations” (2012) 128 
L.Q.R. 232. For specific examples, see J. Dietrich, “The Liability of Accessories under Statute, in Equity, and in 
Criminal Law: Some Common Problems and (Perhaps) Common Solutions” (2010) 34 Melbourne University 
Law Review 106; E. Bant, “Statute and Common Law: Interaction and Influence in Light of the Principle of 
Coherence” (2015) 38 UNSW Law Journal 367, 382-385. 
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wrong. Most of the work in this respect tends to be done by doctrinal or statutory formulation, 
although it may be placed upon the individual decision-maker.105 
Conversely, the elements of Davies’ conception of accessory liability have fixed content. The 
conduct element, for example, is either satisfied or not. If a third party’s involvement does not 
satisfy the minimal assistance required, no further inquiry is needed. Similarly, Davies insists 
that subjective actual knowledge is essential. Thus, he rejects the argument that a lesser degree 
of knowledge may suffice where, for example, A seeks to procure a wrong (or an outcome that 
turns out to be a wrong).106 He does so on the grounds of simplicity and uniformity:107  
This approach would render the law very complex and require fine distinctions to be 
made about the type of conduct element involved. … There is no need for the law to 
introduce the complexities inherent in varying the mental element according to the 
precise mode of participation in the primary wrong.108 
Similarly, after stating that ‘[t]he law is clearly much easier to state if the mental element does 
not vary according to the nature of the defendant’s participation’, Davies describes the problem 
as follows:  
[a single mental element] happily avoids the complexities inherent in the tremendously 
difficult exercise of managing fine distinctions between different conduct elements and 
mental elements.109 
But this is to misunderstand the dynamic operation of accessory liability, namely that it does 
not draw fine distinctions at all. Establishing fault involves an overall assessment of the conduct 
and mental state of a person in the context of the circumstances in which it occurs. This means 
of course, that as the courts repeatedly stress, liability requires a close analysis of the facts.110  
                                                          
105 See the examples given in the text to nn 5-9 above. The influential judgment of Finn, Stone and Perram JJ in 
the Federal Court of Australia in Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) (2012) 200 F.C.R. 296 at [247], 
albeit encompassing equitable participatory liability more generally, captures the dynamic operation of the law: 
[P]articipatory liability as it evolved in equity … was not based on inflexible formulae. Given the variety 
of circumstances in which, and bases on which, a third party could be characterised as a wrongdoer in 
equity…varying importance has been given to three matters: (i) the nature of the actual fiduciary or 
trustee wrongdoing in which the third party was a participant; (ii) the nature of the third party's role and 
participation, eg as alter ago, inducer or procurer, dealer at arm's length, etc; and (iii) the extent of the 
participant's knowledge or, assumption of the risk of, or indifference to, actual, apprehended or suspected 
wrongdoing by the fiduciary. 
106 See Davies, Accessory Liability, at pp. 127-129, referring to P.D. Finn, “The Liability of Third Parties for 
Knowing Receipt or Assistance” in D.W.M. Waters (ed.), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Carswell, 1993) 215-
217. P. Ridge, “Participatory Liability for Breach of Trust or Fiduciary Duty” in J. Glister and P. Ridge (eds.), 
Fault Lines in Equity (Oxford 2012) 139. 
107 Davies, Accessory Liability, at pp. 127-129, 282. 
108 Ibid., at pp. 128-129.  
109 Ibid., at p. 282. 
110 Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] UKSC 10, [2015] A.C. 1229 at [56]. 
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4. The mental element of accessory liability  
Davies either rejects cases that extend liability beyond actual knowledge as over-extending 
accessory liability,111 as wrong,112 or as not accessory liability at all.113 The difficulty with this 
approach is that a uniform requirement of subjective actual knowledge is easily evaded and 
does not reflect the current law. As will be discussed below, contrary to the uniform conception, 
there are differences across private law as to the degree and content of A’s knowledge that are 
required to satisfy the mental element of accessory liability. Nor will a lesser requisite degree 
of knowledge necessarily implicate non-culpable defendants. For example, where A’s effort is 
directed at procuring an outcome, it may not matter much whether A actually knows precisely 
how PW achieves that outcome, if there was a high degree of risk that PW can only achieve 
A’s objectives through wrongdoing. If A exerts pressure on a trustee, PW, to withdraw trust 
funds and invest them in A’s business where A has some reason to believe that this may be an 
unauthorised investment and breach of trust, why should A be able to respond: ‘But I did not 
know; I never saw the trust instrument’?114 And it must surely be relevant, when assessing A’s 
fault, that A has profited from PW’s conduct in having more capital investors.115 Not 
surprisingly, the rules of equity reflect that standard, where recklessness as to a breach 
occurring is accepted as sufficing for liability, that is, where there is a ‘substantial and 
unjustifiable risk’ of a breach.116 
Another weakness in insisting upon actual knowledge in all circumstances is that this is of 
limited use unless one articulates precisely what it is that A must know: the content of A’s 
knowledge. The difficult work of adjudicating A’s culpability is largely done by determining 
the requisite content of knowledge that A must have had about that wrongdoing. The cases are 
                                                          
111 See, e.g., Davies, Accessory Liability, at pp. 114-16.  
112 See, e.g., ibid., at pp. 203-205. 
113 See, e.g., ibid., at pp. 66-68.  
114 In some scenarios wilful blindness may be apparent, but not all scenarios could be made to fit that 
characterisation. Compare, in the context of inducing breach of contract, the fact that it is not for A to claim that 
for all she knew, there may have been a lawful way for PW to terminate the contract. See, eg, Delphic Wholesalers 
Pty Ltd v Elco Food Co Pty Ltd (1987) 8 I.P.R. 545, 553-554. 
115 Davies, Accessory Liability, at pp. 129-30, criticises the view of one of us, Ridge, “Participatory Liability for 
Breach of Trust or Fiduciary Duty”, at pp. 131-141, that benefit to A is a relevant consideration in assessing A’s 
culpability. We adhere to that view: Dietrich and Ridge, Accessories, at para. [8.3.2.3]. Such benefit strengthens 
the likelihood of liability for reckless conduct. 
116 See, e.g., Imobilari Pty Ltd v Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd [2008] FCA 1920 at [28] (Finkelstein J).  
The same position appears to apply in the tort of inducing breach of contract, where A may be liable where there 
is a substantial risk that PW will breach her contract. An inducer of a breach of contract can rarely know the 
precise terms of PW’s contract and PW’s options, lawful or otherwise, as to how to respond to A’s inducing 
conduct. Requiring near certainty of breach (that is, actual knowledge that PW will breach), rather than merely a 
high degree of risk of such a breach, would make A’s liability almost impossible to establish. 
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often focussed on entirely factual questions of what A knew about the circumstances of PW’s 
conduct and intentions, and what A needed to know, in order to have sufficient cognition of 
the potential commission of a wrong when A offered assistance to PW, or induced PW, to carry 
out certain acts. These include matters such as the time of the wrong, the place of the wrong, 
the intended victim(s), whether indeed PW’s conduct is a wrong (and with what generality or 
specificity A identified the intended wrong). The issue is often encapsulated in terms of the 
‘essential matters’ of PW’s wrong.117 If the law insists on actual knowledge at all times, this 
may be circumvented quite simply by stating in broad, rather than precise, terms what it is that 
A must know. In other words, a rigid requirement of ‘actual knowledge’ might lead courts to 
find that A indeed had actual knowledge, but of much less detailed information about PW’s 
intended conduct and the surrounding circumstances than might otherwise have been required 
if the law demanded a less onerous degree of knowledge.  
Thus, fine distinctions between degrees of knowledge are by the way without clear 
identification of the requisite content of A’s knowledge on the facts of a given case. Similarly, 
there may not be a single answer to the question of the degree to which A knew particular facts. 
A may subjectively (‘actually’) know some key facts, but have been merely reckless in relation 
to others, going to PW’s intentions and plans (or, say, PW’s relationship with the claimant and 
the details of PW’s obligations). Thus, any supposed certainty in the application of a fixed 
requirement of actual knowledge is, we suggest, illusory. 
In any case, what is clear is that there is a diversity of accessory principles throughout private 
law and these do not necessarily conform to a uniform requirement of subjective actual 
knowledge of PW’s wrongdoing. One example, namely the position in equity, suffices, but any 
number of others could be given.118 In equity, some jurisdictions have accepted that a lesser 
                                                          
117 See Dietrich and Ridge, Accessories, at para. [3.4.2.2]. 
118 For example, in the tort of inducing breach of contract, it suffices that A was recklessly indifferent to the 
possibility that PW’s conduct amounts to a breach; that is, it need not be a near certainty that a breach will occur. 
Similarly, the law is particularly complex concerning the liability of directors and officers for company 
wrongdoing, especially where they have procured the company to engage in conduct that turns out to be wrongful. 
Although most cases are consistent with the need for some knowledge, this need not necessarily be actual 
knowledge. See, eg, seemingly accepting a recklessness standard, that an infringement was substantially likely to 
follow, see Societa Esplosivi Industriali SpA v Ordnance Technologies (UK) Ltd (No 2) [2007] EWHC 2875 (Ch), 
[2008] 2 All E.R. 622, particularly at pp. 649-50 para. [95] (Lindsay J), and the state of knowledge of the director 
in that case. In limited circumstances directors may be liable (albeit, unusually so) even in the absence of 
knowledge of the wrongfulness of the company’s conduct: that is, liability may be tantamount to strict. Particularly 
in the context of intellectual property infringements, the predominant view appears to be that A (a director or 
officer) need not necessarily know that PW Co’s conduct is wrongful, that is tortious or infringing. See, e.g., 
Microsoft Corporation v Auschina Polaris Pty Ltd (1996) 71 F.C.R. 231, 235 (Lindgren J). That proposition seems 
uncontroversial. See also C Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand Ltd [1985] 2 All E.R. 415, 424- 425 (Slade LJ), 
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mental state than subjective actual knowledge may suffice for accessory liability. In Australia 
knowledge by A of circumstances that ‘would indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable 
man’ is the minimum level of required knowledge.119 That extension beyond actual knowledge 
is aimed at capturing the morally ‘obtuse’, who do not recognise an impropriety.120 Similarly, 
the English approach reflects a pragmatic acknowledgement that it is unwise to pin down the 
degree or content of A’s knowledge required for liability in equity: 
The individual is expected to attain the standard which would be observed by an honest 
person placed in those circumstances. It is impossible to be more specific.121  
In summary, a uniform conception of accessory liability places pressure on the legal rules and 
can lead to strained or artificial interpretations of a complex legal regime. This creates its own 
uncertainty. The uniformity approach assumes the virtue of simplicity and logic in the 
expression of the law, but why must the law have an internal logic at all costs? A conception 
of accessory liability that is too pristine runs the risk of misrepresenting current law and 
distorting its future development. 
V. CONCLUSION The premise of the various conceptions of private law considered in 
this article is that it is possible through scholarly work to influence and improve the law’s 
development. However, there is an inevitable tension between the search for clarity and 
illumination of fundamental principles (which may lead the theorist away from current 
expressions of the law) and the potential for the theory to make a useful contribution to 
development of the law. An additional challenge for any theory involving accessory liability is 
ambiguous terminology, particularly terminology that was either not present in the traditional 
doctrinal discourse or is used in different senses in different parts of the law. Of course, the 
beauty of the common law is its ability to smooth out, in incremental fashion, the blunt 
instrument of legal theory: adopting its best features and rejecting the rest. Nonetheless, the 
process may be painful and is not of much comfort to litigants along the way. Recently, some 
commentators and judges have sought to dismiss the relevance to private law of the label and/or 
concept of accessory liability. Others have sought to elevate the accessory conception to a 
                                                          
followed, e.g., in Handi-Craft Company v B Free World Ltd [2007] EWHC B10 (Pat), but also rejected, e.g., in 
Root Quality Pty Ltd v Root Control Technologies Pty Ltd (2000) 177 A.L.R. 231 at [136]. 
119 See Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 C.L.R. 89 at [177], and Consul Development 
Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 C.L.R. 373. It is level (iv) knowledge under the Baden scale: Baden v 
Société Générale pour Favoriser le Développement du Commerce et de l’Industrie en France SA [1993] 1 W.L.R. 
509. 
120 Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 C.L.R. 89 at [177]; Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining 
NL (No 2) (2012) F.C.R. 296 at [267]. 
121 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378, 390. 
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single and simplified cause of action that applies uniformly throughout private law. Our 
conception of accessory liability pursues a path between these extremes. Accessory liability is 
important and operates throughout private law but does not do so uniformly. A conception of 
accessory liability, the specific content of which must be fleshed out by reference to the values 
and purposes underlying the law of the primary wrong, in our view, most accurately and 
straightforwardly describes a fundamental legal norm operating across private law and is a 
useful vehicle for developing the law where that is necessary. 
 
